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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clifford Stewart appeals from his conviction for felony stalking.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
After he waived his preliminary hearing (R., p. 30), the state charged
Stewart with felony stalking and misdemeanor violation o f a no-contact order.
(R., pp. 32-34, 54-55.) The state's probable cause affidavit stated that the victim
"has been receiving emails at her job in Twin Falls from Clifford Stewart ... in
violation of an active no contact order ...." (R., pp. 9, 57.) The affidavit also
stated that Stewart had been previously convicted of stalking the victim and a
condition of his probation was to have no contact with the victim. (R., p. 58.)
Stewart filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the information did not allege a
course of conduct, which he claimed was a necessary element of the crime. (R.,
p. 51.) The district court concluded that the information was not sufficient, but
allowed the state to amend.

(R., pp. 68-73, 92.)

The second amended

information alleged felony stalking as follows:
That the defendant, CLIFFORD RANDALL STEWART, on or
between Spring 2006, to the 31Stday of December, 2007, in the
County of Minidoka and the County of Cassia, State of Idaho, did
feloniously engage in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed,
annoyed or harassed another person, [G.J.], by sending her
unsolicited emails, leaving her unsolicited love notes, giving her
gifts, calling her on the telephone, and by repeatedly displaying
affection towards [G.J.] by various means and on numerous
occasions, where the actions constituting the offense are in
violation of a no contact order; or where the defendant had been
previously convicted of stalking in the second degree within the last
seven years; or where the actions constituting this offense are in
violation of a condition of probation.

(R., pp. 94-95.)
Stewart filed another motion to dismiss "upon the grounds and for the
reason that the State's Affidavit of Probable Cause does not state a course of
conduct, as is necessary in the Statues [sic]." (R., p. 97.) After a hearing on the
motion (R., p. 103), the district court denied the motion (R., pp. 104-09).
Stewart later pled guilty by plea agreement in which he preserved his right
to appeal from the motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 122-24, 134-36.) The district court
thereafter entered judgment. (R., pp. 145-48.) Stewart filed a timely appeal from
the judgment. (R., p. 6.)

ISSUE
Stewart states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion
to dismiss the felony stalking charge?
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Stewart failed to demonstrate on appeal that he proved that the
current felony stalking charge is barred under principles of double jeopardy by his
previous misdemeanor stalking conviction?

ARGUMENT
Stewart Has Failed To Demonstrate On Appeal That He Proved That The
Current Felonv Stalkinq Charae Is Barred Under Principles Of Double Jeopardy
Bv His Previous Misdemeanor Stalkins Conviction
A.

Introduction
The trial court noted that it "has not been provided with any information

regarding which of the acts by the Defendant form the basis for" the prior
misdemeanor conviction, but assumed that the prior stalking conviction "arose
out of the same course of conduct or acts that form the basis for the instant
prosecution." (R., p. 106.) The district court framed the issue as "whether, in the
instant prosecution, the State is permitted [to] use acts of the Defendant that led
to his prior misdemeanor stalking conviction to prove the element of a 'course of
conduct' sufficient to satisfy § 18-7905(1)." (R., p. 106.) The court then denied
Stewart's motion, reasoning that the statute as written applied to Stewart's
conduct and that Stewart had failed to demonstrate that the prior conviction acted
as a bar to the current prosecution. (R., pp. 106-09.) Stewart argues that the
district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-20.) Application of the correct legal
standards to this issue, however, shows that there is no double jeopardy problem
because the statute is being applied in this case exactly as the legislature
intended.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a prosecution complies with the constitutional protection against

being placed twice in jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
v. Hussain, 143 Idaho 175,176,139 P.3d 777,778 (Ct. App. 2006).

C.

Stewart Presented No Evidence Whatsoever That His Prior Conviction
Encom~assedThe Conduct As Currently Charqed
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to prevent multiple prosecutions for

"the same offence."

U.S. Const., Amend. V.

The underlying predicate of

Stewart's double jeopardy argument is his factual claim that this is the "same
offence" as gave rise to his prior misdemeanor conviction because the current
felony stalking charge is based, with the exception of one incident of harassment
of the victim (an e-mail), on the conduct for which he was already convicted.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) This factual claim is, however, not supported by
the record. Because Stewart failed to prove that the conduct underlying his prior
misdemeanor conviction was also the conduct underlying the current felony
charge, his double jeopardy claim fails.
As set forth above, the state charged Stewart with stalking as follows:
That the defendant, CLIFFORD RANDALL STEWART, on or
between Spring 2006, to the 31'' day of December, 2007, in the
County of Minidoka and the County of Cassia, State of Idaho, did
feloniously engage in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed,
annoyed or harassed another person, [G.J.], by sending her
unsolicited emails, leaving her unsolicited love notes, giving her
gifts, calling her on the telephone, and by repeatedly displaying
affection towards [G.J.] by various means and on numerous
occasions, where the actions constituting the offense are in
violation of a no contact order; or where the defendant had been
previously convicted of stalking in the second degree within the last
seven years; or where the actions constituting this offense are in
violation of a condition of probation.
(R., pp. 94-95.) Of course none of the actual charge itself states that any of the
course of conduct alleged formed the basis for the prior conviction.

Stewart extrapolates from the date of the prior conviction, August of 2007,
that all acts of stalking prior to August of 2007 must have formed the basis for the
prior conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) He compares part of the affidavit
of probable cause that states that Clifford was charged for the misdemeanor for
conduct between Spring 2006 to July 30, 2007 (Appellant's brief, p. 12 (citing R.,
p. 90)) with the state's supplemental discovery response (Appellant's brief, pp.
12-13), coupled with a reference to a single e-mail in December of 2007 in the
affidavit (Appellant's brief, p. 12),' and concludes that because the e-mails listed
on the supplemental discovery response all occur between January 13,2007 and
July 28, 2007, that "the evidence that the State was intending to rely on was
evidence of the same course of conduct for which Mr. Stewart had previously
been sentenced" (Appellant's brief, p. 13).
This argument is devoid of merit for many reasons, including, but not
limited to the following: (1) Stewart may not rely on the evidentiary value of the
supplemental discovery response because he never asked the district court to
consider that response as evidence of what conduct formed the basis of the prior
conviction, State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct.
App. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not consider new evidence
that was never before the trial court."); (2) the discovery response is
supplemental, necessarily meaning that it does not represent the entirety of the
"evidence the State was intending to rely on" as claimed by Stewart (Appellant's

'

The state notes that because Stewart waived his preliminary hearing the
probable cause affidavit was entirely gratuitous and that nothing in the record
actually reflects what evidence the state would have submitted at trial.

brief, p. 13); (3) even though the e-mails listed in the supplemental response
were dated within the time-frame of the underlying conviction there is no
evidence that they were part of or necessary to that conviction; (4) the probable
cause affidavit clearly states that the victim complained "that she has been
receiving emails at her job in Twin Falls" and that "these emails are in violation of
an active no contact order" (R., p. 88 (emphasis added)). That the rest of the
affidavit focuses on a single e-mail (R., p. 89), does not in any way prove that the
state had evidence of only a single e-mail, as opposed to the "emaiis" the victim
stated she had been receiving in violation of the no-contact order.
In this case Stewart did not present the charging document related to the
underlying misdemeanor.

He did not submit any evidence of what the

prosecution presented in the trial of that charge. In short, he presented no
specific evidence whatsoever of what conduct formed the basis of the
misdemeanor stalking charge. His entire claim was based on assumptions and
speculation. It was not enough to show that the state's evidence would include
evidence of his prior conduct; Stewart bore the burden of showing that the state
in this case was prosecuting him for the same offense for which he had already
been convicted. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385-87 (1992).
The district court "accept[ed] as true" the claim that "the Minidoka
conviction arose out of the same course of conduct or acts that form the basis for
the instant prosecution," but also stated: "The Court has not been provided with
any information regarding which of the acts by the Defendant form the basis for
the Minidoka County conviction." (R., p. 106.) Because Stewart failed to present

any evidence proving his claim that the acts underlying his previous conviction
would be the same acts supporting the current felony charge, he failed to show
that double jeopardy was implicated in this case. Where the lower court reaches
the correct result by relying on an incorrect legal theory, the appellate court will
affirm the result under the correct legal theory. McKinnev v. State, 133 ldaho
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 929 ldaho 700, 704, 931
P.2d 1218,1222 (1997); see also State v. Rhoades, 134 ldaho 862,864.11 P.3d
481, 483 (2000). Because, as noted by the district court, Stewart presented no
evidence to support his claims, the district court should be affirmed on the basis
that the record does not show that the factual underpinnings of Stewart's claim
are correct.
D.

Even Assumina There Was Onlv One Act Of Stalkina That Did Not Form
The Basis Of The Prior Conviction, Stewart Has Failed To Show The
Current Char~eOf Stalkinq Was Barred By Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides

that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amend. V. This Clause affords a defendant three
basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S.
222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 ldaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct.
App. 2001).
In Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), the Supreme Court of the
United States decided a double jeopardy issue very similar to the one before this

Court. The issue in that case was whether it violated the second and third
double jeopardy protections stated above (second prosecution after conviction
and multiple punishments for same offense) to use facts underlying a prior drug
trafficking conviction to prove a predicate act of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise.
Id, at 775-77.2
As to whether a second prosecution was prohibited because of the prior
conviction, the Court applied a two-step analysis.

Id.at 778-893.

The first step

of the analysis is one of legislative intent: "Where the same conduct violates two
statutory provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine
whether the legislature ... intended that each violation be a separate offense."
Id. at 778. The second step is to determine whether the prosecution is for the
"same offence" within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

& at 786.

The analysis of these two prongs in Garrett shows that there was no double
jeopardy bar in this case.
Review of the statutory provisions shows a legislative intent that a prior
conviction for misdemeanor (second degree) stalking does not bar a conviction
for felony (first degree) stalking where the defendant continues to stalk the same
victim by continuing the same course of stalking conduct after his conviction.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a statute.

State

v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those words must

'The state acknowledges that the analysis applicable to this case would likely not
apply if there had been a prior acquittal, because "the Double Jeopardy Clause
attaches special weight to judgments of acquittal." Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,
41 (1982).

be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute must be
construed as a whole.

Id.

Where the language of a statute is plain and

unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 462, 988
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581
(1996). The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 ldaho at 362,
79 P.3d at 721;

w,133 ldaho at 462,988 P.2d at 688.

The relevant language of the felony stalking statute provides: "A person
commits the crime of stalking in the first degree if the person violates section 18-

7906, ldaho Code, and ... The actions constituting the offense are in violation of
a ... no contact order ... or ... are in violation of a condition of probation or parole

...." I.C. 5 18-7905(1) (emphasis added). A violation of section 18-7906, in turn,
requires a "course of conduct." I.C.

5

18-7906(1), defined as "repeated acts of

nonconsensual contact involving the victim ..." I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a). Thus, under
the plain language of this section, a person who "violates section 18-7906 and
whose actions are in violation of a no-contact order or condition of probation
commits a felony stalking, without regard for whether some of the stalking course
of conduct has been subject to a prior charge or conviction.
Stewart would essentially have this Court read this statute as applying
only to a person who "violates section 18-7906 [and has not been previously
convicted for this conduct]" and meets the felony element. He argues that the
statute requires that the course of conduct be conduct entirely post-dating any

prior conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-15.) This argument makes no sense
under either the plain language or the obvious intent of this statute. It simply
makes no sense to conclude that this statute makes continued stalking of a
victim a felony only if the defendant engages in two incidents of harassment after
imposition of a no-contact order or condition of probation. The legislature here
intended that conduct like Stewart's, where he continued the same course of
harassment of the same victim after conviction and entry of a no-contact order
~
and condition of probation, to fall within the ambit of the felony s t a t ~ t e . The
legislature intended this statute to apply exactly as it has been applied in this
case.
The second prong of the double jeopardy analysis, whether the charged
crime is the "same offence" as the prior stalking, is also met in this case. In
reviewing this prong of the test in Garret the Court distinguished Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977), where the crimes of "joyriding" and theft were the "same
offence," on the basis that in

Brown

the "very same conduct" supported both

charges; "Every moment of [Brown's] conduct was as relevant to the joyriding

The state also submits that legislative intent that a defendant who continues
stalking the same victim after his misdemeanor conviction is guilty of a felony for
the first new stalking incident is shown by the legislative history of this law.
Although our legislative history is less detailed that that of Congress, the state
has included with this brief the bill's statement of purpose (Appendix A), and the
relevant minutes from the hearing of the House Judiciary, Rules and
Administration Committee for January 27, 2004 (Appendix B), the relevant
minutes from the hearing of the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration
Committee for February 17, 2004 (Appendix C), and the relevant minutes and
exhibit from the hearing of the Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee for March
3, 2004 (Appendix D). This legislative history shows legislative intent that
stalking preceding entry of a no-contact order or condition of probation be treated
as part of the course of conduct.

charge as it was to the auto theft charge." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 787. In contrast,
Garrett's prior conviction covered only a few days out of the course of the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, and the CCE was not completed until after
Garrett had already been charged on the trafficking offense.

at 788. The

Court stated:
Whenever it was during the 5%-year period alleged in the
indictment that Garrett committed the first of the three predicate
offenses required to form the basis for a CCE Prosecution, it could
not then have been said with any certainty that he would
necessarily go ahead and commit the other violations required to
render him liable on a CCE charge.
Id. at 788-89. Likewise, in this case, when Stewart initially stalked this victim it
could not have been said with any certainty that he would continue that conduct
after imposition of a condition of probation and a no-contact order. Although
there is overlap, as in Garrett the state was not charging the same crime for
purposes of double jeopardy.
The Court in Garrett then went on to reject an argument either identical to
Stewart's or so close as to make no difference. The Court stated: "We have
steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transaction' view of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."

a at 790.

The Court instead referred to Diaz v. United States, 223

U.S. 442 (1912). where the Court concluded it did not violate the Double

Jeopardy Clause to prosecute Diaz for murder after his conviction for assault and
battery where his victim later died of injuries inflicted during that attack. Garrett,
471 U.S. at 791.

Like

m,where the state lacked the ability to put the

defendant in jeopardy for murder before his victim died, Garrett had not
completed his Continuing Criminal Enterprise before being charged with the

trafficking offense. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791.

Likewise, the state lacked the

ability to put Stewart in jeopardy for felony stalking until after his conviction and
entry of the no-contact order and the condition of probation and Stewart's actions
in resuming his stalking of the victim. The act of resumption of the same stalking
course of conduct, which could not have been anticipated at the time of the first
prosecution, makes this a different offense for purposes of double jeopardy.
The Garrett Court next determined that the double punishment bar had not
been violated. The Court stated that the "Double Jeopardy Clause does no more
than prevent the sentencing court from proscribing greater punishment than the
legislature intended." Garrett, 471 U.S. at 793 (internal quotes and citations
omitted).

Here the ldaho Legislature certainly intended that a stalker who

continues his course of conduct after being convicted be punished for the new
offense. I.C. § 18-7905(4). Disallowing cumulative sentences would here have
the "anomalous effect" of preventing punishment of defendants who continue
stalking the same victim after a misdemeanor conviction. See id. at 793-94.
The analysis and the result in Garrett apply here. The ldaho Legislature
intended that a stalker convicted of a misdemeanor and ordered to have no more
contact with that victim would commit a felony if he continued his stalking of that
victim.

The Legislature did not intend that the defendant get one "free"

harassment of an already stalked victim after entry of a no-contact order or
condition of probation. This law does not violate the prohibitions against double
jeopardy because it involves a continuation of the conduct, and is therefore not
the "same offence" in either law or fact. Nor are there multiple punishments for

the same crime because the continuation of the course of conduct creates a
factually and legally new and distinct crime. Thus, even assuming that Stewart
continued his course of stalking behavior by sending only one e-mail after his
misdemeanor conviction, double jeopardy does not bar his trial, conviction or
sentence for felony stalking.
Stewart argues that where a crime is a single course of conduct the state
may not arbitrarily charge the defendant with multiple crimes. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 13-15.) While this is generally true it has no application to the facts of this
case or the interpretation of I.C. § 18-7905. Stewart relies on Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977), for this proposition. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) As shown
above, the Supreme Court of the United States distinguished

in Garrett,

471 US. at 787-88. That analysis applies here. If Stewart's argument is taken to
its logical extreme, Stewart would be granted immunity against prosecution from
stalking the same victim by the reasoning he proposes, because at least in
theory all future stalking would merely be part of the same course of conduct he
started in 2006. The state is not, as set forth in Garrett, prosecuting Stewart for
the same course of conduct under double jeopardy.
Stewart also argues that the felony and misdemeanor stalking are not
different crimes for purposes of double jeopardy under the standard of
Blockburaer v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-19.)
However, "the Blockburger rule is not controlling when the legislative intent is
clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history." Garrett, 471 U.S. at
779. It is merely a rule of statutory construction that does not control where there

is "a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." Albernaz v. United States, 450
U.S. 333, 340 (1981). As shown above, the Idaho Legislature's intent to bring
within the ambit of the felony stalking statute those who continue stalking their
victims after conviction or issuance of a no-contact order or condition of probation
is clear in the statute; therefore this argument is without merit.
The prosecution and conviction of Stewart in this case does not implicate
the Double Jeopardy Clause. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States about the underlying purposes of that clause:
As we have explained on numerous occasions, the bar to retrial
following acquittal or conviction ensures that the State does not
make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing
him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while
increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly
enhanced sentence.
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) (holding that the state was not
barred from pursuing murder and aggravated robbery charges after defendant's
guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and theft in the same case). See also
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982) (concerns of double jeopardy not implicated
where appellate wurt grants new trial based on weight of evidence instead of
sufficiency of evidence); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (double
jeopardy concerns not implicated where defendant seeks acquittal on grounds
other than sufficiency of state's evidence); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463
(1964) (grant of immunity from punishment too high a price under double
jeopardy where guilty plea, entered after jury was sworn, was reversed on
appeal). Where the state has prosecuted and convicted a defendant for part of
an ongoing course of criminal conduct, these concerns are not necessarily

implicated when the state subsequently prosecutes for the continued and
completed course of criminal conduct. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773
(1985).

Here the state is not seeking to wear down Stewart and obtain a

conviction or sentence it has been denied. On the contrary, Stewart of his own
will continued his same course of conduct following his prior conviction, elevating
his continued course of conduct to a felony in the eyes of the law. Stewart has
failed to show that prosecuting him for his entire course of conduct violates the
protections against double jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Stewart's conviction for
felony stalking.

DATED this 1" day of October 2009,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this I"day of October 2009 sewed a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

APPENDIX A

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS 14049
his legislation breaks stalking out intd first-degree and
cond-degree stalking. First-degree stalking is a felony and is
itted when an individual commits second-degree stalking and
ast one of the enumerated aggravators. The penalty for
econd-degree stalking is the same as that already provided in

FISCAL IMPACT
e fiscal impact is difficult to determine with certainty as it
ends upon the increased number of offenders charged with and
icted of felony stalking. The impact to the general fund
11 be equal to the cost of imprisoning the additional number of
fenders, if any, charged, convic;ed and sentenced to prison
der the revised felony section of this code.

ame: ~epresentativeDebbie Field
hone: 332-1000

TATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE

APPENDIX B

Chairman Field called on Representative Rydalch. Representative
Rydalch said this proposed change to the office of the Attorney General
will provide that a department, agency, office, officers, board,
commission, institution or other state entity may be represented by or
obtain its legal advice from either the Attorney General's office or from an
attorney at law in the private sector. This proposed legislation would
allow state entities to make a choice on who would represent them.
Representative Clark said there is a technical problem with this change.
It would result in a large fiscal impact instead of a revenue neutral impact.
Representative Pasley-Stuart registered her concern regarding the
proposed legislation.
MOTION:

Representative Nielsen moved to introduce RS13623Cl. Roli call vote
was requested.

ROLL CALL
VOTE:

Voting AYE-Representatives Ellsworth, Ridinger, Nieisen, Shirley. Voting
NAY-Representatives Field, Clark, Sali, Smith, Harwood, Kulczyk, Ring,
Wills, Boe, Andersen, Pasley-Stuart. MOTION FAILED 4-11-1.

RS13730:

Chairman Field recognized Heather Reilly to explain the proposed
legislation. Ms. Reilly said this legislation divides the crime of stalking
into first-degree and second-degree stalking. First-degree stalking is a
felony which is committed when an individual commits second-degree
stalking and one of the aggravating factors is present as enumerated in
the proposed legislation. Such factors include stalking a victim who is
under sixteen and the stalking of a victim against whom certain crimes
have already been committed by the perpetrator. The penalty for seconddegree stalking is the same as that already provided in Idaho Code.
Stalking in the first degree is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one
year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Definitions are also provided for "family member" and "nonconsensual
contact."

MOTION:

Representative Ring moved to introduce RSl3730. Motion carried.

PRESENTATION

Chairman Field recognized Olivia Craven to update the members on the
State of the Commission of Pardons & Parole. Ms. Craven said the
Legislature saw fit to increase the number of employees of the
Commission. As a result, the Commission has been able to take on more
duties and help out the Department of Corrections. Crimes of violence
always come before the Commission. Parole determination is at the
complete discretion of the Commission. Parolees must serve one year on
parole. The Commission does a lot in the area of restitution and it is
working to make sure inmates are out when they are supposed to be.
Drug courts are having a very positive effect in helping to keep people out
of prison. Programs need to continue to be provided and structured
reentry into the workplace is most important. Inmates receive vocational
training once they have been tracked in the rehabilitation program.

ADJOURN:

Chairman Field thanked Ms. Craven and told the members that the
Thursday meeting will be the last day to hear personal legislation. The
Chair said there are four important issues facing the Committee. A task
force needs to be made up to study each issue. The issues are: estate
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PRO:

Kathy Figueredo was recognized. Ms. Figueredo said her daughter was
murdered. The daughter had been a vital part of the family and of
Mountain Home. It is essential for victim's families to have a voice. This
legislation will give our citizens a voice in order to speak for those who
are murdered.

PRO:

Jessica Terry was recognized. Jessica's sister was murdered. She was
before the Committee to speak on behalf of her sister. This legislation
would allow victim impact information which is very important in these
cases.

PRO:

Darlene Shaw was recognized. Ms. Shaw said she was here today to ask
the committee to vote for this bill so that family members will have a voice
to provide an impact on the trial. Her daughter was a victim at 13 years
of age.

MOTION:

After a discussion on the importance of getting the bili into law,
RepresentativeWills moved to send H 609 to General Orders with an
emergency clause added. Motion carried. Representative Wills will
carry the bill on the floor.
Representative Wills was recognized. This bill simply says the Supreme
Court will have the discretion to set the period of time that an
administrative judge will serve. This will assure a greater depth of
experience and continuity of leadership in carrying out Supreme Court
policies and the duties of their office.

MOTION:

Representative Clark moved to send H 642 t o the floor with a Do Pass
recommendation. Motion carried. Representative Wills will carry the
bill on the floor.
Representative Shirley was recognized. This bill will assist counties in
recovering some of their cost of providing court generated legal forms
and written materials, training covering the application and use of these
documents, and other services provided in connection with court
assistance offices and coordinated family services. Representative
Shirley gave each member an Executive Summary (attached.) The fees
established by the Supreme Court will be reasonably related to and will
not exceed the actual costs involved in furnishing the forms or providing
the other services.

MOTION:

Reprssentative Clark moved to send H 644 t o the floor with a Do Pass
recommendation. Motion carried. Representative Shirley will carry
the bili on the floor.
Heather Reiliy was recognized to explain the legislation. Ms. Reilly said
she was presenting the bill at the request of Representative Field. This
legislation repeals Section 18-7905, ldaho Code, relating to stalking, and
adds a new section 18-7905 to provide for the crime of stalking in the first
degree and to define terms and set forth punishment. Chapter 79, Title
18, ldaho Code, is amended by the addition of a new section, 18-7906,
to provide for stalking in the second degree, to define terms and to set
forth punishment. Section 19-603 is amended to provide a code
reference and descriptive language.
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Kathy Peterson was recognized to give her testimony. Ms. Peterson.said.
she is a victim of stalking. A former fiance threatened her life. He. . . ,
conned her out of around forty thousand dollars and carved on his belt ..
that she would die when she broke up with him. The judges in
misdemeanor court did not seem to take the matter very seriously. She
had a civil restraining order which he violated. He also violated a no
contact order. He has been in and out of mental hospitals. He has also
made threats to others. In conclusion Ms. Peterson asked that the law be
changed by passing this bill. It is necessary to tell the perpetrators that
this type of stalking is a serious crime. It needs to be a felony.

PRO:

Heather Reiily was recognized to respond to questions asked by the
committee. She confirmed that the language on page 2, lines 12 and 13
would require proof of some kind of intent to use the deadly weapon or
instrument. a brandishina or some other similar serious act, in order to be
an aggravating circumstance sufficient to eievate a second'degree
stalking charge to stalking in the first denree. Ms. Reilly also confirmed
that the less serious crimes included in Chapters 9, 15and 61 of Title 18
would not be sufficient to eievate a second degree stalking charge to
stalking in the first degree.

MOTION:

Representative Saii moved t o send H 668 t o the floor with a Do Pass
recommendation. Motion carried. Representative Field will carry the
bill on the floor.

ADJOURN:

Prior to adjourning, Chairman Field said the time has been reached when
the committee must move along on the bills,. We will fry to hear the
remainder of the bills in the committee by the endof February. There will
be a meeting on Friday, February 27, immediately upon adjournment.
There being no further business to come before the committee, the
meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m.

Representative Debbie Field
Chairman
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APPENDIX D

MINUTES

SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

DATE:

March 3, 2004

TIME:
PLACE:

Room 437

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Lodge, Senators Sorensen,
Richardson, Bunderson, Davis, Sweet, Mariey, Burkett

MINUTES:

Senator Lodge made a motion to accept the minutes of March 1 as
written, Second was by Senator Richardson and the motion carried by
a voice vote.
TO establish a study committee to undertake and complete a study of the
statutes governing charter schools. This bill will be referred to the.
Education Committee.
Provides for definitions of specialty journeymen and apprenfices. This bill
will be referred to the Commerce Committee.
Relating to the ldaho Transportation Board, the State Highway Account
and the ldaho Housing and Finance Assn. to utilize bonds or notes to
finance projects for transportation infrastructure. This bill will be referred
to the Transportation Committee.

MOTION:

Senator Davis made a motion to send RS14217, RS14229 and RS14234
to print. Second was by Senator Richardson and the motion carried by
a voice vote.
Patti Tobias presented this bill for the ldaho Supreme Court, that will
This bill will increase the annual salary of justices of the supreme court,
judges of the court of appeals, district judges, and attorney and
nonattorney magistrate judges by two percent (2%) beginning July 1,
2004. Presently there are no nonattorney magistrate judges sewing fulltime in the state of ldaho. However, the annual salary of this category of
judge must keep pace with salary increments granted to other categories
of judges in order to adequately compensate retired nonattorney
magistrate judges who are called in to sewice on a temporary basis under
Section 1-2221, ldaho Code. The two percent (2%) salary increase for
justices and judges will cost $279,700.00, which is funded from the
general fund and was approved by JFAC last week.

MOTION:

Senator Davis made a motion to send $1407 to the floor with a do pass.
Second was by Senator Sweet and the motion carried by a voice vote.

H668

Representative Debbie Field presented this bill that was drafted after a
call from a woman who was stalked for over 10 years and the statutes in
ldaho couldn't help her. The law needed to be taken one step further and
this legislation will do that by breaking stalking out into first-degree and
second-degree stalking. First-degree stalking is a felony and is committed
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES March 3,2004 -Minutes - Page 1

when an individual commits second-degree stalking and at least one of
the enumerated aggravators. The penalty for second-degree stalking is
the same as that already provided in Idaho Code.
Re~resentativeField told the committee that she had put several of their
phone numbers into a Google Search and found 2 pages of information
on them including a map to their homes. She said that it is very easy to
find a person and the law needs to be tougher for those that do.
Kathv Peterson, the victim of stalking that called Chairman Field, told the
committee that she was engaged to a man, who borrowed $40,000 from
her and when she broke up with him, would not quit harassing her. She
made police reports, but was told that the City didn't have the money or
the manpower to do forensics to determine if it was her former fiance.
She paid for her own forensics and it proved to be Jeff Richland, as she
thought. The judge suspended any sentence, there was no fine or
penalty, and she was made to feel like she was pushing a mute issue.
Jeff married many times, and had threatened ex-girlfriends as recently as
6 months ago, some of whom are trying to help Ms. Peterson.
Senator Darrington told Ms. Peterson that the committee was concerned
that the stalking law put on the books about ten years ago is not
adequate.

Heather Reilly, Idaho Prosecuting Association supports the bill. She said
that they had looked at the bill and given their input. At a recent stalking
conference there was a concern about the technology for use with Global
Satellite Positioning systems (GPS), so now the language can include "by
electronic means".
Ms. Reillv presented a sheet of stalking facts. (See attached #I)
While
legal definitions of stalking vary from one jurisdiction to another, stalking
generally refers to a course of conduct that involves a broad range of
behavior directed at the victim. The conduct can be as varied as the
stalker's imagination and ability to take actions that harass, frighten
threaten and/or force himself or herself into the life and consciousness of
the victim. The report states that 1,006,970 women and 370,990 men are
stalked annually in the United States, and 77% of female as well as 64%
of male victims know their stalker. Stalking is a crime under the laws of
all 50 states, and the District of Columbia and stalking is considered as a
felony upon the first offense in 14 states. Thirty-four states classify
stalking as a felony upon the second offense and/ or when the crime
involves aggravating factors. Aggravating factors may include:
possession of a deadly weapon; violation of a court order or condition of
probationlparole; victim under 16; and same victim as prior occasions.
Senator Burkett asked why there was such an expansive definition of
family, and especially including roommates. Ms. Reilly said that a lot of
victims are in college and it is common for stalkers to go to a residence
and make roommates the subjects of the harassment. The intent of this
bill is to include people that are in contact with the target to protect them.
She told the committee that she felt this bili was an imorovement in the
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law.
MOTION:

to the floor with a do pass.
Senator Burkett made a motion to send
Second was by Senator Lodge and the motion carried by a voice vote.
Senator Burkett and Senator Lodge will co-sponsor this bill on the
Senate floor.

Maior Ralph Powell, ldaho State Police presented this bill whose purpose
is to seek restitution for the analysis of controlled substances for
conviction on misdemeanor drug offenses as well as felony drug
offenses. The laboratory incurs the same analysis expense regardless of
whether the evidence results in a felony or misdemeanor conviction.
ldaho Code allows restitution to be sought from offenders, upon
sentencing, for the analysis of felony controlled substances. Restitution
amounts paid to the ldaho State Police are deposited into the drug
enforcement donation fund which are used to pay a portion of the cost to
analyze drug evidence submitted by law enforcement agencies;
purchase, repair and maintain instruments, equipment and supplies; and
pay for training and general operationslmaintenance of the laboratory.
It is estimated that this proposal may generate up to $50,000 annually for
the ldaho State Police. These funds will be added to the Drug
Enforcement Donation Account as outlined in the Funds Consolidation
Act, ldaho Code 57-816. The Joint Finance Appropriation Committee has
given authority for this. Major Powell said that for $100 analyzed sample,
they get $16.50.
MOTION:

Senator Lodge made a motion to send
to the floor with a do pass.
Second was by Senator Sorensen and the motion carried by a voice
vote. Senator Lodge will carry this bill on the Senate floor.

H520

Colonel Dan Charboneau, ldaho State Police presented this bill relating to
the ldaho DNA database Act of 1996. He introduced the director of the
DNA , Cindy Hill.
This proposed amendment to the statute provides for the addition of two
new classes of offenders subject to sample collection: felony burglary and
felony domestic violence; and provides that persons may be ordered by
the court to pay restitution to help offset costs incurred by law
enforcement agencies for the expense of DNA analysis. Burglars are
known to have a high correlation with rape, and DNA database research
has proven this.
A review of the state of Virginia database showed that nearly half of all
the hits on unsolved rapes come from offenders with prior burglary
convictions. Domestic assaults likewise are violent crimes often leading to
rape or homicide. Inclusion of these crime categories in the DNA
database will increase law enforcement's ability to identify and more
quickly bring to justice the perpetrators of violent crimes. ldaho is now on
line with STR (Short Tandem Repeat) DNA analysis and CODlS
(Combined DNA Index System), and can provide DNA analysis on
samples submitted for a variety of crimes. DNA analysis is a costly
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES March 3,2004 - Minutes - Page 3

S t a l k i n g-

resource center
www.ncvc.org/src
Tel. (202) 4674700
E-mail: src@ncuc.og

Crime v i c t i m con calk
1-800Fn-CALL.
/or 0~1iSlnnce
M-F 8:30 AM - 8:30 PM
W H A T I S STALKING?

While legal definitions of stalking vary from one jurisdiction to another, stalking generaliy refers to a course of conduct that involves
a broad range of behavior directed at the victim.The conduct can be a s varied a s the stalker's imagination and ability to take actions
that harass, frighten, threaten and/or force himself or herself into the l i e and consciousness of the victim.
Adapted horn: US Department oflustice. (2001). .REPDDIlo Conprs on Statkin*-eL

..

1,006,970 women and 370,990 men are stalked annually in the
United States.
e 1 in 12 women and 1 in 45 men will be stalked in their Metime.
a 77%of female and 64%of male victims know their stalker.
8% of stakers are men.
x 59%of female victims and 30%of male victims are staked by an
intimate partner.
s 81%of women stalked by a rent or former intimate partner are
also physically assaulted by that partner.
931%of women stalked by a current or former intimate partner are
also sexually assaulted by that partner.
m 73%of intimate partner stalkers virbaUy threbtened the victims
with physid violence, and almost 46%of victims experienced one
or more violent incidents by the stalker.
= The average duration of stalkingis 1.8 years.
n If stalking involves intimate partnen, the average duration of
s W g increases to 2.2 years.
61%of stdkers made unwanted phone cds; 33%sent or left
unwanted letters or items; 29%vand&ed properly; and 9% kilied
or threatened to kiii a family pet
e 28%of female victims and 10% of male victims obtained a
protective order. 69%offemale victims and 81%of male victims
had the protection order violated.
naden B: Thoenner. (1998). "Stdking in America" NU.
s

------.
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~ s ~ ~ ~ & f i ~ & ~ e Stalkjng is a crime under the laws of all 50 states, the Disriict of
Columbia, and the Federal Government
r 14 states classify stalking as a felony upon the first offense.'
o 34 states classify stalking as a felony upon the second offenseand/or
when the crime involves aggravating facton.'
u Aggravating factors may include: possession of a deadly weapon; viola.
tion of a court order or condition ofprobation/parole; victim under 16:
same victim as prior occasions.
For a complete 6st of state, mbai and Feded lawrvirit wununma%/rrc
' Last updated Much 2W3
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Simple obsessional stalkers are the most common m e , They have
some prior relationship with the victim, usually an intimate one. These
cases most often occur in the contert of domestic violence.
Love obsessional stalkers have had no &sting relationship with the
victim. Many of these stalkers &get celebrities.
Erotomanic staken delusionally believe that they are loved by the
victim. ?his is the &st category of stalkers.
Individual pmeminrs may not pietirely 6t any single staikci category, and onen
exhibit characlcrirtia assdated with more than one category: it ir jnpoimant to
remember that fhese Npoiogier we merely guider.
Meioy. (1998). '?he Psycholon of W n g : AP
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s 56%ofwomen stalked took some lype ofseli.protective measure;

often as drastic as reiocating (11%).maden & Thoennes. (1998).
'Stalking in America,"NW
s 26%of stalking victims lost time from woik as a result of their
victimization,,md7Cd never returned to work. Crjaden &Thoennes.)
r 30%of female victims and 20% of male victims sought psychological
counseling. maden & Thoennes.)
c The prevalence of anxiety, insomnia, social dysfunction, and severe
depression is much higher among staiking victims than the general
popula~on,
8 the stalking involves being foUowed or having
one's properly destioyed. (Blauus e t al. (2092). 'Toe Toll of S W g ! '
1.Interpenonal Viol.)
w>".*:,.x?;*>;,...T%6
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' y 76%of femicide victims had been staked.
E

67%had been physically abused by their intimah partner.
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nte SlolhLrg Resource Ce,iter is a Program oftlie National Centerfor Viciims
o/Cn'me. Our duo1 mission is to raise naliotial oworenm ofslalking o~rdto
e,lcouroge lhe deoofopment and implementation o/mullidirciplinary r@onses
ro r~aihingin loin! conrmvnilies across the rovntij iVe con provide you with:
e Training
c Technicai Assistance
r Protocol Development
: Resources
Help in coliaborating with other agencies and systems in your communily
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Fisher. CuUen, and T u n e i (MWI. I h e Sexual Viehkation of CoUcge Women.'
NUIBIS.
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oifemicide victims who had been physically abused had also
3 . ~ ~ ~ , s ~ L ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ rd89%
. ~in the?12 months
l f before
f ~the.murder.
~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .
been~stalked
,>'?

~

13%of college women were stalked during one six to nine month period.
r: 80%of campus stalking victims knew thek stalkers.
s 3 in 10 college women repdrted being injured emotionally or
psychologicdy from being stalked.

79% abused femicidevictimsreported stalkingduring the same
abuse,
period that they
"
anempled lemicide cases
at least One WiSodeOf
stalking within 12 months prior to the attempted femicide.
:,54%of iemicide victims reported stalking to poiice before they
were Mled by their stalkers.
'?he murder of a woman
hlcFulmlane el al. (1999). 'Stsihng and intimate Paiinci Femicide,"Homicide Swdies.

Contact us a t 202-467-8700or src@~~cuc.org.
This documcnt war dcveiopd under giant numbti981IZ-W-KW8 hom the OGre on Yioience Agdnrr nbmen ( O W 01 the US Depaitment of Justice.
The opinionr and vicrr expressed in thisdorumenlarethow afthe authorlr) and do not neiers+!y reprorent the officid porition or policier olthe Office on
VioleneeAgain.t\\'omen of the U.S. Department diurtice.
This document may be reproduced oniy in ia entireiy Any allemtion%mu* be spprovcd by the SMaiking Resource Cenlci Contact ur at 1202)467.8700, or ri<@nrvi.org

